The applicant is subject to sanctions if a certification it makes becomes untrue.  The certifications are designed so that the applicant should either know or be able to control whether the certification stays true during the period to which a certification applies.  There is no exception from sanctions if a certification becomes untrue, even if an action taken by the applicant is not the proximate cause. 

In weighing the appropriateness of a sanction, we would expect that the Board would consider whether the applicant should have reasonably been aware of the possibility of the event that caused the certification to become untrue, as well as the nature of the relationship between the applicant and the party whose action caused the certification to become untrue. 

Sanctions can be imposed for such a violation.  These sanctions include loss of all rights to serve any BGS Load won in the auction, forfeiture of the Pre-Auction Letter of Credit, liquidated damages of $100,000, action under state or federal laws, debarment from participation in future BGS Auctions, prosecution under applicable state and federal laws, or other sanctions that the Board may consider appropriate.  The Auction Manager will make a recommendation to the Board on a possible sanction and the Board will make the final determination. 

It depends on the certification.  Some certifications of the Part 2 Applications are required for a Qualified Bidder to become a Registered Bidder.  For example, a Qualified Bidder must certify that, other than agreements disclosed in the Part 1 Application, the Qualified Bidder has not entered into any agreement with any other Qualified Bidder regarding participation in the auction for which it is applying.  If a Qualified Bidder is unable to make this certification, the Qualified Bidder will not be able to participate in the auction.

Other certifications of the Part 2 Application allow the Qualified Bidder to make an information disclosure to explain why it is unable to make a certain certification.  For example, a Qualified Bidder that is unable to certify that it is not associated with any other Qualified Bidder will be asked to identify the Qualified Bidder(s) with which it is associated, and will be asked to describe the nature of the association.  If a Qualified Bidder makes such a disclosure because it cannot make one of the certifications in the Part 2 Application, this disclosure will be considered when the Part 2 Application is processed.  The Auction Manager may require additional information and will decide on a course of action on a case-by-case basis to preserve the competitiveness and integrity of the auction.  This course of action could include allowing the Qualified Bidder to complete the Part 2 Application successfully without additional undertakings, could include requiring additional undertakings as a condition for the successful completion of the Part 2 Application and for participation in the auction, and could include rejection of the Part 2 Application.

Yes.  The BGS-RSCP and BGS-CIEP Auctions are separate in all important respects.  The evaluation of the Association and Confidential Information Rules pertains to each auction separately.  A bidder in the BGS-RSCP Auction is asked in its Part 1 and Part 2 Applications to make a number of certifications found in the BGS-RSCP Auction Rules.  In these rules, a “bidder” means a bidder in the BGS-RSCP Auction.  Most of these certifications are made in Insert #P2-1 required by the Part 2 Application, where it is stated: "In these certifications, a “Qualified Bidder” refers to an entity qualified to participate in the BGS-RSCP Auction."  Similarly, a bidder in the BGS-CIEP Auction is asked in its Part 1 and Part 2 Applications to make a number of certifications found in the BGS-CIEP Auction Rules.  In these rules, a “bidder” means a bidder in the BGS-CIEP Auction.  Most of these certifications are made in Insert #P2-3 required by the Part 2 Application, where it is stated: "In these certifications, a “Qualified Bidder” refers to an entity qualified to participate in the BGS-CIEP Auction.”

The objectives of the Association and Confidential Information Rules of preventing collusive arrangements and of preventing any one bidder from gaining superior information regarding its competitors mean that these rules do imply some restrictions on the day-to-day market activities of bidders and on possible supply arrangements. 

For example, if one bidder (Bidder A) transacts with another bidder (Bidder B) and in the process Bidder A learns Bidder B’s valuation for the auction product, then Bidder A would have gained superior information about a competitor, and this transaction could foster collusion (see, for instance, FAQ-39 and FAQ-40).  The fact that the Association and Confidential Information Rules aim to prevent a bidder from gaining superior information about its competitors that might affect the Auction Process implies that Bidder A cannot sell a full-requirements product to Bidder B.  Such a supply arrangement would provide Bidder A with reliable information regarding Bidder B’s valuation of the auction product.  This is an example of a restriction on supply arrangements implied by the Association and Confidential Information Rules.  As another example, each bidder is asked to certify that it has not entered into a supply arrangement that would provide explicit instructions on how to bid (see certification 5 of the Association and Confidential Information Rules portion of the Auction Rules, section VI.E.4 in the BGS-CIEP Auction Rules and section VII.E.4 in the BGS-RSCP Auction Rules).  This is a restriction on supply arrangements that aims to prevent coordination of bidding of several bidders if these bidders all entered into supply arrangements that provided bidding instructions. 

The Association and Confidential Information Rules attempt to place only necessary restrictions on supply arrangements and on day-to-day market activities.  Such restrictions are unavoidable if these rules are to meet their goals.  These rules may impact hedging activities and supply arrangements of bidders.  Each bidder should be aware of these rules at all times, should be aware of the entities that have become Qualified Bidders for the auction in which it is participating, and should be especially mindful of these rules from the start of the auction until the Board renders a decision on the auction results.  For additional information, see, for instance, FAQ-43, FAQ-44, and FAQ-45, as well as other questions and answers in the “Transactions and Hedging” section of this document.

The Association and Confidential Information Rules do not “permit” or “prohibit” any specific transaction.  Rather, these rules focus on employing a system of certifications to ensure that competition in the auction is not compromised either because bidders are not bidding independently, or because a bidder gains superior information about its competitors that might affect the Auction Process.  If a bidder is unable to make a certification, typically the bidder will make an information disclosure and the Auction Manager may ask for more information to decide, on a case-by-case basis, upon a remedy that will ensure that competitiveness at the auction is not jeopardized (see, for instance, FAQ-27).  A list of permitted or prohibited transactions is not feasible or practicable: a given transaction may in one context allow the bidder to make all the certifications in the Association and Confidential Information Rules, while the same bidder may be unable to make one or more certifications with respect to the same type of transaction in another context.  The bidder must make this determination considering the full context in which the transaction is made.

Yes.  If a bidder is party to a bidding agreement with another party, is part of a bidding consortium or joint venture for the purpose of bidding in the auction, or is party to any arrangement involving joint or coordinated bidding with another party, then the bidder is not bidding independently.  Any such agreement and arrangement must be disclosed in the Part 1 Application. 

Furthermore, the Association and Confidential Information Rules included in the BGS-RSCP Auction Rules (section VII.E.) and the BGS-CIEP Auction Rules (section VI.E.) provide specific criteria for one bidder to be associated with another bidder.  Such associations are links among bidders that may impede their ability to act independently.  Bidders are entirely responsible for reviewing these criteria and for evaluating their ability to make certifications in this regard.  Any such associations must be declared in the Part 2 Application.  

The intent of the Association and Confidential Information portion of the Auction Rules is to promote the competitiveness of the auction, to uphold the integrity of the Auction Process, to prohibit collusive arrangements, and to ensure that no bidder gains superior information regarding its competitors that might affect the Auction Process.  A bidder shows compliance with these rules by making a number of certifications in the Part 1 Application and the Part 2 Application.  If a bidder is able to make all the certifications, the bidder complies with the Association and Confidential Information Rules.  The certifications ensure that the bidder is not part of a collusive arrangement, the bidder does not gain superior information regarding its competitors that might affect the Auction Process, and the bidder is not providing to others information related to the auction or its bidding strategy.

Yes.

Supplements A, B, and C to the 2025 BGS-RSCP Supplier Master Agreement (“BGS-RSCP SMA”) filed on July 1, 2024, specify the conditions under which BGS-RSCP suppliers that serve tranches procured in the 2025 BGS-RSCP Auction will be paid (or will pay) for the difference between the rate paid by BGS-RSCP suppliers for capacity and the Capacity Proxy Price in the 2025/2026, 2026/2027, and 2027/2028 delivery years, respectively.

As described in the EDCs’ Proposal for Basic Generation Service Requirements to be Procured Effective June 1, 2025 (“Joint Proposal”), the EDCs proposed setting a Capacity Proxy Price for each of the 2025/2026, 2026/2027, and 2027/2028 delivery years that suppliers would be able to incorporate into their bids in the event that the results of PJM’s base residual auction (“BRA”) for that delivery year are not known at least five business days prior to the start of the BGS-RSCP Auction.  The EDCs also proposed that if the results of the BRA for the 2025/2026 delivery year, the 2026/2027 delivery year, or the 2027/2028 delivery year are known at least five business days prior to the start of the BGS-RSCP Auction, the Capacity Proxy Price for the applicable delivery year will no longer be needed and will be voided (Joint Proposal at page 8). As the results of the BRA for the 2025/2026 delivery year were made available in July 2024, the Capacity Poxy Price for the 2025/2026 delivery year and Supplement A to the BGS-RSCP SMA are voided in accordance with the EDCs’ Joint Proposal.

As described in the Joint Proposal, winning BGS-RSCP suppliers will be paid the closing price (cents/kWh) in the BGS-RSCP Auction for load served. In the 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 delivery years, BGS-RSCP suppliers will additionally be paid (or will pay) the difference between the rate paid by BGS-RSCP suppliers for capacity and the final Capacity Proxy Price for that delivery year. These payments will only occur in the 2026/2027 delivery year or in the 2027/2028 delivery year, even if the value of the capacity price for that delivery year is known prior to the start of that delivery year - but only if the results of the BRA for that delivery year are not known at least five business days prior to the start of the BGS-RSCP Auction. This construct provides certainty to BGS-RSCP suppliers that they will be fully compensated for the actual rates for capacity that they pay in the 2026/2027 and in the 2027/2028 delivery years (Joint Proposal at pages 16-17).

Please see each EDC’s rate design spreadsheet posted to the Additional Data Room of the BGS Auction website for example calculations of the true-up mechanism described in the Supplements to the BGS-RSCP Supplier Master Agreement.

The EDCs’ Joint Proposal is available on the BGS Proceeding page of the BGS Auction website. 

The data can be found on the New Jersey Office of Clean Energy’s website here: https://www.njcleanenergy.com/rps.

No. The BGS-RSCP Pricing Tool posted to the Additional Data page of the BGS Auction website on August 20, 2024 does not include the results for PJM’s 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction. The Tool posted on August 20, 2024 reflects the rate design methodology as proposed by the Electric Distribution Companies (“EDCs”) in their Proposal for Basic Generation Service Requirements to be Procured Effective June 1, 2025 that was filed on July 1, 2024, prior to the release of the results of PJM’s 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction. We expect to provide an updated version of this Tool in January 2025.  Updated BGS-RSCP Pricing Factors spreadsheets were posted for each EDC to the Additional Data page of the BGS Auction website on December 5, 2024 following the EDCs' compliance filing.

Revised 12-12-2024

This information is available upon request from the Auction Manager.

The BGS Data Room provides prospective bidders with access to historical data for each of the EDCs. Each cell in the tables on the Data Room pages contains information about the associated data series, including an icon indicating the file format. Clicking on this icon will download the file. These data files must be downloaded individually.

Yes. The Total Exposure Amount (“TEA”) reflects the total credit exposure of the BGS-RSCP Supplier to the EDC arising under all contracts with the BGS-RSCP Supplier.  To determine the TEA, the Mark-to-Market (“MtM”) Exposure Amount (calculated by deducting the accounts payable from the total MtM credit exposure) for all BGS-RSCP Agreements that a BGS-RSCP Supplier holds with a given EDC are summed and added to the credit exposures under any BGS-CIEP Agreement that the Supplier holds with the same EDC.  Whenever the sum of the MtM Exposure Amounts over all agreements yields a negative number the TEA is deemed to be zero.

The BGS Auction Manager has made available redlines between the Final 2024 BGS-CIEP and BGS-RSCP SMAs and the SMAs filed as part of the EDCs’ Proposal for the provision of Basic Generation Service for the period beginning June 1, 2025. The redlines are available on the Contract and Credit page of the “bidder info” tab of the BGS Auction website.

The data you request is not available. However, please find below a description of how broker quotes are used to calculate the forward market prices for purposes of the mark-to-market (“MtM”) exposure amount calculation.

Forward market prices are calculated using data from brokers, which is defined in the BGS-RSCP SMA to include both independent brokers and exchanges active in the energy markets. Data sources have changed periodically based on data availability. The sources currently used are Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. (“ICE”), NYMEX, TFS Energy LLC (“TFS”), and Amerex Brokers LLC (“Amerex”).

The forward market prices are calculated by averaging the available broker quotes and the broker quotes may be for individual months, two-month blocks, or quarterly blocks. The “MtM Exposure Amount Calculation Information” section of Appendix B describes how the EDCs unpack multi-month blocks to derive forward market prices for individual months in instances where a block and a component of the block are available. Using multiple sources and employing a method to unpack two-month blocks and quarterly blocks allows the EDCs to maximize the number of quotes used to calculate the forward market prices.

When quotes are available from more than one data source, the forward market prices are calculated by averaging the available broker quotes. When quotes are only available from a single broker or data source, and that source is ICE, then the forward market prices are calculated as the average of the ICE quotes over the preceding five (5) days. Forward market prices for the months, two-month blocks, or quarterly blocks where broker quotes are unavailable from any broker will be equal to the last available broker quote or in case they have not been quoted since the BGS-RSCP Auction closed, they will be equal to the marks set at the close of the BGS-RSCP Auction.

Please see Appendix B of the BGS-RSCP SMA for additional details surrounding the MtM calculation.

The New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (“BPU”) is expected to render its decision on the results of the BGS-CIEP and BGS-RSCP Auctions within two business days of the close of the BGS-CIEP or BGS-RSCP Auction, whichever occurs later.

If the BPU approves the results of a BGS Auction, the Auction Manager will notify any winning bidders of such approval that same day. Winning bidders will then be contacted directly by the EDCs regarding the execution of the BGS Supplier Master Agreement (“SMA”). Winning bidders must execute the SMA, and meet all credit requirements of the SMA, within three business days of the BPU’s decision.

For a winning bidder, the Pre-Auction Letter of Credit is cancelled once the SMA is executed and all credit requirements of the SMA are met.

Information regarding the number of tranches won by each BGS Supplier in each EDC territory is typically released in early May, approximately one month before the supply period starts. Results of previous BGS Auctions, including the 2024 BGS Auctions, can be found on the Past Results page of the BGS Auction website.

The New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (“Board”)’s order approving the results of the 2024 BGS Auctions can be found here.

JCP&L has confirmed that beginning August 1, 2022, the excess generation data reported in the BGS Data Room does not need to be summed with the corresponding load data in order to develop JCP&L load data consistent with how JCP&L load is reported to PJM for settlements purposes.

For data prior to August 1, 2022, to develop JCP&L load data that is consistent with how JCP&L load has been reported to PJM for settlement purposes, sum the excess generation with the load reported in the BGS Data Room. This calculation can also be used to develop JCP&L total hourly BGS Load, JCP&L total retail hourly load, and BGS-CIEP hourly load net of excess generation. To develop BGS-RSCP hourly load (for data prior to August 1, 2022), first subtract the developed BGS-CIEP load data from the developed Total BGS load data, then sum this value with the Total Retail Hourly excess generation data.

The BGS Auction Manager has posted an updated Data Description file on the monthly data page of the BGS Auction website.

The BGS Auction Manager no longer updates JCP&L excess generation data as part of the BGS Monthly Data update. The excess generation data reported in the BGS Data Room was last updated on January 17, 2024 and contains data through October 31, 2023.

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