In your Part 1 Application, you agreed not to disclose that you are a Qualified Bidder.  In your Part 2 Application, you agreed not to disclose that you are a Registered Bidder (see, for instance, FAQ-24, FAQ-25, FAQ-29, and FAQ-32). 

There are ways in which auction participation could be revealed absent an explicit statement that you are intending to bid in the auction.  Doing so could violate certifications that you have made in the Part 1 and Part 2 Applications.  What you may be able to say for purposes of your SEC disclosure without violating certifications in the Part 1 and Part 2 Applications depends on your other business activities and your overall business outlook.

To the extent that you own significant generation in PJM, the marketing of which would be materially affected by the auction, providing factual information about the auction would not be unusual and it would not necessarily reveal that you are participating in the auction.  A generation owner in PJM would be expected to have an interest in the BGS Auctions given that the auctions may create a demand for forward power products.  These products need not be sales made at the auctions, but could be anything including sales of standard products to bidders or third-party suppliers.  The auctions could thus be material to such an entity, even if it were not participating in the auctions.  For such an entity to include in its SEC filings public factual information about the auctions or to refer to previously disclosed information about the auctions, would not, if carefully done, reveal that the entity is a Qualified Bidder or a Registered Bidder.  It should be clear to readers of such information that whether or not the entity is a bidder, the BGS Auctions could have an effect on the entity's business outlook.  Such a release of information, if carefully done, need not violate any certification. 

At the other end of the spectrum, an entity that has no significant presence in PJM and that included in its SEC filings information about the auctions may well be viewed as using the filing to communicate that it is participating in one or both of the BGS Auctions.  Such an entity may be violating the certification that it will not reveal that it is a Qualified Bidder or Registered Bidder in one or both of the BGS Auctions.

No, this would not be a violation of those certifications.  

Once the auction has concluded, if the Board approves the auction results, the Board may choose to release information regarding final auction prices and the names of the winners.  The Association and Confidential Information Rules state that, at that point, a winner may itself release information (only) regarding the number of tranches it has won and the territories that the winner will be serving.  The Association and Confidential Information Rules state that, at that point, a losing bidder may itself release information (only) regarding the fact that it participated in the auction. 

The Registered Bidder may not make such a disclosure prior to the Board having approved the auction results.  Winners and losing bidders otherwise continue to be bound by all certifications from the Association and Confidential Information Rules that extend beyond the Board decision on the auction results.  Please consult the Association and Confidential Information Rules portion of the Auction Rules to identify which certifications must be upheld beyond the Board decision on the auction results.

No, once an entity has completed the Part 1 Application for a BGS Auction, this entity cannot announce that it is participating in a BGS Auction.  In its Part 1 Application, the entity certifies that upon becoming a Qualified Bidder, it will not disclose information regarding the list of Qualified Bidders, including the identity of any one Qualified Bidder.  This prohibits the Qualified Bidder from announcing or revealing to anyone that it is itself a Qualified Bidder, since this would reveal the identity of a Qualified Bidder. 

In its Part 2 Application, the Qualified Bidder certifies that upon becoming a Registered Bidder, it will not disclose information regarding the list of Registered Bidders, including the identity of any one Registered Bidder.  This prohibits the Registered Bidder from announcing or revealing to anyone that it is itself a Registered Bidder, since this would reveal the identity of a Registered Bidder. 

Furthermore, an entity cannot discuss its participation with anyone while the auction is on-going.  In its Part 1 Application, the entity also agrees to the Auction Rules.  At that point, the entity agrees that as a Qualified Bidder, it will not disclose any confidential information regarding the Auction Process. Confidential information regarding the Auction Process explicitly includes the status of a bidder’s participation in the auction.  There are only narrow and specific exceptions to this principle; namely, the Qualified Bidder may discuss confidential information regarding the Auction Process with an Advisor, or with bidders with which it is associated (as disclosed in its Part 2 Application).

Yes.  An entity that receives a Notification of Qualification acquires Qualified Bidder status and retains this status until the end of the Auction Process.  Similarly, an entity that receives a Notification of Registration acquires Registered Bidder status and retains this status until the end of the Auction Process.  There is no possibility to rescind or change this status.  This means that an entity that becomes a Qualified Bidder and that does not submit a Part 2 Application is bound by all the certifications it has made in the Part 1 Application.  Similarly, an entity that becomes a Registered Bidder is bound by all the certifications it has made in the Part 1 and Part 2 Applications, regardless of whether the Registered Bidder subsequently participates in the auction. 

Please review the certifications in the Part 1 and Part 2 Applications for more details and in particular for the time period during which these certifications must remain in effect.

• it is not associated with another Qualified Bidder; 
• it has not entered into any agreement with another Qualified Bidder regarding bids at the auction; 
• it is not a party to any contract for the purchase of power that might be used as source of supply for BGS-RSCP, and that (i) would require the disclosure of any confidential information (confidential information relative to the bidding strategy or confidential information regarding the Auction Process) to the counterparty under such a contract; or (ii) that would require the disclosure of any confidential information (confidential information relative to the bidding strategy or confidential information regarding the Auction Process) to any other party; or (iii) that would provide instructions, direct financial incentives, or other inducements for the bidder to act in a way determined by the counterparty in the agreement and/or in concert with any other bidder in the auction; 
• it does not have any knowledge of confidential information relative to the bidding strategy of any other Qualified Bidder; 
• it has not disclosed confidential information relative to its bidding strategy; 
• no party has agreed to defray any of its costs of participating in the auction; and 
• it will not disclose any confidential information regarding the Auction Process.

The applicant is subject to sanctions if a certification it makes becomes untrue.  The certifications are designed so that the applicant should either know or be able to control whether the certification stays true during the period to which a certification applies.  There is no exception from sanctions if a certification becomes untrue, even if an action taken by the applicant is not the proximate cause. 

In weighing the appropriateness of a sanction, we would expect that the Board would consider whether the applicant should have reasonably been aware of the possibility of the event that caused the certification to become untrue, as well as the nature of the relationship between the applicant and the party whose action caused the certification to become untrue. 

Sanctions can be imposed for such a violation.  These sanctions include loss of all rights to serve any BGS Load won in the auction, forfeiture of the Pre-Auction Letter of Credit, liquidated damages of $100,000, action under state or federal laws, debarment from participation in future BGS Auctions, prosecution under applicable state and federal laws, or other sanctions that the Board may consider appropriate.  The Auction Manager will make a recommendation to the Board on a possible sanction and the Board will make the final determination. 

It depends on the certification.  Some certifications of the Part 2 Applications are required for a Qualified Bidder to become a Registered Bidder.  For example, a Qualified Bidder must certify that, other than agreements disclosed in the Part 1 Application, the Qualified Bidder has not entered into any agreement with any other Qualified Bidder regarding participation in the auction for which it is applying.  If a Qualified Bidder is unable to make this certification, the Qualified Bidder will not be able to participate in the auction.

Other certifications of the Part 2 Application allow the Qualified Bidder to make an information disclosure to explain why it is unable to make a certain certification.  For example, a Qualified Bidder that is unable to certify that it is not associated with any other Qualified Bidder will be asked to identify the Qualified Bidder(s) with which it is associated, and will be asked to describe the nature of the association.  If a Qualified Bidder makes such a disclosure because it cannot make one of the certifications in the Part 2 Application, this disclosure will be considered when the Part 2 Application is processed.  The Auction Manager may require additional information and will decide on a course of action on a case-by-case basis to preserve the competitiveness and integrity of the auction.  This course of action could include allowing the Qualified Bidder to complete the Part 2 Application successfully without additional undertakings, could include requiring additional undertakings as a condition for the successful completion of the Part 2 Application and for participation in the auction, and could include rejection of the Part 2 Application.

Yes.  The BGS-RSCP and BGS-CIEP Auctions are separate in all important respects.  The evaluation of the Association and Confidential Information Rules pertains to each auction separately.  A bidder in the BGS-RSCP Auction is asked in its Part 1 and Part 2 Applications to make a number of certifications found in the BGS-RSCP Auction Rules.  In these rules, a “bidder” means a bidder in the BGS-RSCP Auction.  Most of these certifications are made in Insert #P2-1 required by the Part 2 Application, where it is stated: "In these certifications, a “Qualified Bidder” refers to an entity qualified to participate in the BGS-RSCP Auction."  Similarly, a bidder in the BGS-CIEP Auction is asked in its Part 1 and Part 2 Applications to make a number of certifications found in the BGS-CIEP Auction Rules.  In these rules, a “bidder” means a bidder in the BGS-CIEP Auction.  Most of these certifications are made in Insert #P2-3 required by the Part 2 Application, where it is stated: "In these certifications, a “Qualified Bidder” refers to an entity qualified to participate in the BGS-CIEP Auction.”

The objectives of the Association and Confidential Information Rules of preventing collusive arrangements and of preventing any one bidder from gaining superior information regarding its competitors mean that these rules do imply some restrictions on the day-to-day market activities of bidders and on possible supply arrangements. 

For example, if one bidder (Bidder A) transacts with another bidder (Bidder B) and in the process Bidder A learns Bidder B’s valuation for the auction product, then Bidder A would have gained superior information about a competitor, and this transaction could foster collusion (see, for instance, FAQ-39 and FAQ-40).  The fact that the Association and Confidential Information Rules aim to prevent a bidder from gaining superior information about its competitors that might affect the Auction Process implies that Bidder A cannot sell a full-requirements product to Bidder B.  Such a supply arrangement would provide Bidder A with reliable information regarding Bidder B’s valuation of the auction product.  This is an example of a restriction on supply arrangements implied by the Association and Confidential Information Rules.  As another example, each bidder is asked to certify that it has not entered into a supply arrangement that would provide explicit instructions on how to bid (see certification 5 of the Association and Confidential Information Rules portion of the Auction Rules, section VI.E.4 in the BGS-CIEP Auction Rules and section VII.E.4 in the BGS-RSCP Auction Rules).  This is a restriction on supply arrangements that aims to prevent coordination of bidding of several bidders if these bidders all entered into supply arrangements that provided bidding instructions. 

The Association and Confidential Information Rules attempt to place only necessary restrictions on supply arrangements and on day-to-day market activities.  Such restrictions are unavoidable if these rules are to meet their goals.  These rules may impact hedging activities and supply arrangements of bidders.  Each bidder should be aware of these rules at all times, should be aware of the entities that have become Qualified Bidders for the auction in which it is participating, and should be especially mindful of these rules from the start of the auction until the Board renders a decision on the auction results.  For additional information, see, for instance, FAQ-43, FAQ-44, and FAQ-45, as well as other questions and answers in the “Transactions and Hedging” section of this document.

The Association and Confidential Information Rules do not “permit” or “prohibit” any specific transaction.  Rather, these rules focus on employing a system of certifications to ensure that competition in the auction is not compromised either because bidders are not bidding independently, or because a bidder gains superior information about its competitors that might affect the Auction Process.  If a bidder is unable to make a certification, typically the bidder will make an information disclosure and the Auction Manager may ask for more information to decide, on a case-by-case basis, upon a remedy that will ensure that competitiveness at the auction is not jeopardized (see, for instance, FAQ-27).  A list of permitted or prohibited transactions is not feasible or practicable: a given transaction may in one context allow the bidder to make all the certifications in the Association and Confidential Information Rules, while the same bidder may be unable to make one or more certifications with respect to the same type of transaction in another context.  The bidder must make this determination considering the full context in which the transaction is made.

Yes.  If a bidder is party to a bidding agreement with another party, is part of a bidding consortium or joint venture for the purpose of bidding in the auction, or is party to any arrangement involving joint or coordinated bidding with another party, then the bidder is not bidding independently.  Any such agreement and arrangement must be disclosed in the Part 1 Application. 

Furthermore, the Association and Confidential Information Rules included in the BGS-RSCP Auction Rules (section VII.E.) and the BGS-CIEP Auction Rules (section VI.E.) provide specific criteria for one bidder to be associated with another bidder.  Such associations are links among bidders that may impede their ability to act independently.  Bidders are entirely responsible for reviewing these criteria and for evaluating their ability to make certifications in this regard.  Any such associations must be declared in the Part 2 Application.  

The intent of the Association and Confidential Information portion of the Auction Rules is to promote the competitiveness of the auction, to uphold the integrity of the Auction Process, to prohibit collusive arrangements, and to ensure that no bidder gains superior information regarding its competitors that might affect the Auction Process.  A bidder shows compliance with these rules by making a number of certifications in the Part 1 Application and the Part 2 Application.  If a bidder is able to make all the certifications, the bidder complies with the Association and Confidential Information Rules.  The certifications ensure that the bidder is not part of a collusive arrangement, the bidder does not gain superior information regarding its competitors that might affect the Auction Process, and the bidder is not providing to others information related to the auction or its bidding strategy.

Yes.

Supplements A, B, and C to the 2025 BGS-RSCP Supplier Master Agreement (“BGS-RSCP SMA”) filed on July 1, 2024, specify the conditions under which BGS-RSCP suppliers that serve tranches procured in the 2025 BGS-RSCP Auction will be paid (or will pay) for the difference between the rate paid by BGS-RSCP suppliers for capacity and the Capacity Proxy Price in the 2025/2026, 2026/2027, and 2027/2028 delivery years, respectively.

As described in the EDCs’ Proposal for Basic Generation Service Requirements to be Procured Effective June 1, 2025 (“Joint Proposal”), the EDCs proposed setting a Capacity Proxy Price for each of the 2025/2026, 2026/2027, and 2027/2028 delivery years that suppliers would be able to incorporate into their bids in the event that the results of PJM’s base residual auction (“BRA”) for that delivery year are not known at least five business days prior to the start of the BGS-RSCP Auction.  The EDCs also proposed that if the results of the BRA for the 2025/2026 delivery year, the 2026/2027 delivery year, or the 2027/2028 delivery year are known at least five business days prior to the start of the BGS-RSCP Auction, the Capacity Proxy Price for the applicable delivery year will no longer be needed and will be voided (Joint Proposal at page 8). As the results of the BRA for the 2025/2026 delivery year were made available in July 2024, the Capacity Poxy Price for the 2025/2026 delivery year and Supplement A to the BGS-RSCP SMA are voided in accordance with the EDCs’ Joint Proposal.

As described in the Joint Proposal, winning BGS-RSCP suppliers will be paid the closing price (cents/kWh) in the BGS-RSCP Auction for load served. In the 2026/2027 and 2027/2028 delivery years, BGS-RSCP suppliers will additionally be paid (or will pay) the difference between the rate paid by BGS-RSCP suppliers for capacity and the final Capacity Proxy Price for that delivery year. These payments will only occur in the 2026/2027 delivery year or in the 2027/2028 delivery year, even if the value of the capacity price for that delivery year is known prior to the start of that delivery year - but only if the results of the BRA for that delivery year are not known at least five business days prior to the start of the BGS-RSCP Auction. This construct provides certainty to BGS-RSCP suppliers that they will be fully compensated for the actual rates for capacity that they pay in the 2026/2027 and in the 2027/2028 delivery years (Joint Proposal at pages 16-17).

Please see each EDC’s rate design spreadsheet posted to the Additional Data Room of the BGS Auction website for example calculations of the true-up mechanism described in the Supplements to the BGS-RSCP Supplier Master Agreement.

The EDCs’ Joint Proposal is available on the BGS Proceeding page of the BGS Auction website. 

The data can be found on the New Jersey Office of Clean Energy’s website here: https://www.njcleanenergy.com/rps.

No. The BGS-RSCP Pricing Tool posted to the Additional Data page of the BGS Auction website on August 20, 2024 does not include the results for PJM’s 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction. The Tool posted on August 20, 2024 reflects the rate design methodology as proposed by the Electric Distribution Companies (“EDCs”) in their Proposal for Basic Generation Service Requirements to be Procured Effective June 1, 2025 that was filed on July 1, 2024, prior to the release of the results of PJM’s 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction. We expect to provide an updated version of this Tool in January 2025.  Updated BGS-RSCP Pricing Factors spreadsheets were posted for each EDC to the Additional Data page of the BGS Auction website on December 5, 2024 following the EDCs' compliance filing.

Revised 12-12-2024

This information is available upon request from the Auction Manager.

The BGS Data Room provides prospective bidders with access to historical data for each of the EDCs. Each cell in the tables on the Data Room pages contains information about the associated data series, including an icon indicating the file format. Clicking on this icon will download the file. These data files must be downloaded individually.

Yes. The Total Exposure Amount (“TEA”) reflects the total credit exposure of the BGS-RSCP Supplier to the EDC arising under all contracts with the BGS-RSCP Supplier.  To determine the TEA, the Mark-to-Market (“MtM”) Exposure Amount (calculated by deducting the accounts payable from the total MtM credit exposure) for all BGS-RSCP Agreements that a BGS-RSCP Supplier holds with a given EDC are summed and added to the credit exposures under any BGS-CIEP Agreement that the Supplier holds with the same EDC.  Whenever the sum of the MtM Exposure Amounts over all agreements yields a negative number the TEA is deemed to be zero.

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